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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERT P. NEILSON and EILEEN 
W. NEILSON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ISADORE EISEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7306 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the defendant, Isadore Eisen, 
from a judgment of the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Utah, dated December 10, 1948, in favor of the 
plaintiffs and against defendant, Isadore Eisen, in the 
sum of $8,500.00, with interest at the Tate of eight per 
cent per annum from April1, 1947, $500.00 attorney fees, 
and costs. A judgment of no cause of action was rendered 
in favor of the defendant, Freda Eisen, and 'as neither 
of the parties have appealed therefrom, she is not con-
cerned and is not a party in this appeal. 
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2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The co1nplaint of the :plaintiffs was in two counts. 
In their first count, the plaintiffs in substance alleged 
that on December 7, 1946, the plaintiffs entered into a 
\\~ritten agreement \vherein the defendants, Isadore 
Eisen and Freda Eisen, agreed to pay plaintiffs the sum 
of $8,500.00 on or before April 1, 1947; that on April 1, 
1947, the plaintiffs had fully performed ev-ery covenant 
required by them to be performed in said agreement and 
defendants failed and refused to pay the said sum of 
$8,500.00. 
Attached to and by reference incorporated in the 
complaint was a copy of the written agreement. There 
· were, however, two agreements attached to the plaintiffs' 
complaint. The first was a uniform real estate contract, 
dated the·---~-----------day of December, 1946, by and between 
the plaintiffs, as Seller, and the defendant, Isadore Eisen, 
as Buyer, wherein the latter agreed to buy from pJaintiffs 
certain real !property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, 
described as Lot 23, Block 2, Colonial Hills, for the sum 
of $22,000.00, payable as follows: $7;000.00 cash, $'6,500.00 
on or before January 10, 1947, and $8,500.00 on or before 
Aprill, 1947. This agreement, according to the copy at-
tached to plaintiffs' complaint, was signed by plaintiffs, 
a.s ·Seller, and defendants, Isadore Eisen and Freda 
Eisen, as Buyers. The second agreement attached to 
plaintiffs' complaint was dated December 7, 1946, ex-
ecuted by and between plaintiffs, as first parties, and 
the defendant, Freda Eisen, as second party, wherein 
the parties refer to the uniform real estate contract and 
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3 
designate the real property therein sold as being a resi-
dence located at 1887 Harrison Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and "~hich 'vas not entirely completed, and requir-
ing the p·laintiffs to complete the construction of certain 
items before requiring defendant, Freda Eisen, to make 
the final 'payment of $8,500.00 due, under the ter~s of 
the uniform real estate contract, on Ap·ril 1, 1947. 
At this time we call the Court's attention to the fact 
that the defendant, Isadore Eisen, was not a party to the 
uniform real estate contract, but the defendant, Freda 
Eisen, \Yas the only person designated as Buyer and she 
signed the contract as such (Exhibit 4). The situation 
,,·as the same with respect to the second agreement (Ex-
hibit 5). 
In the second count of their complaint, the plaintiffs 
alleged that defendants were indebted to them in the 
sum of $300.00, for materials, labor and contracting 
services. However, they failed to furnish a Bili of Parti-
culars upon order of the Court and did not introduce any 
evidence at the trial in support of their allegations and 
this count was dismissed. 
To this complaint, the ·defendants made answer, 
denying that the defendant, Isadore Eisen, executed the 
agreements attached to plaintiff's complaint and alleged 
that same were executed by the defendant, Freda Eisen, 
\vithout the knowledge or consent of the defendant, Isa-
dore Eisen; and averred further that on or about the 
lOth day of August, 1946, the defendant, Isadore Eisen, 
agreed in writing to purchase the premises described in 
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plaintiffs' complaint for $22,000.00, the plaintiffs agree-
ing, among other things, to erect thereon a double brick 
garage with overhead doors; that thereafter, 1plaintiffs 
erected a wooden garage over the objections of defen-
dant; Isadore Eisen, and did not build the house on said 
premises in accordance with said agreement, by reason 
of which the defendant, Isadore Eisen, was damaged in 
the sum of $2,392.08; that defendant, Isadore Eisen, had 
paid plaintiffs $13,500.00, and ·was entitled to credit of 
said sum of $2,392.08, and offered to pay ;plaintiffs 
$6,107.92 upon plaintiffs executing and delivering him 
a good and sufficient warranty deed of said premises. 
The case came on for trial on November 30, 1948, and 
the evidence established that the defendant, Isadore 
Eisen, was a widower who had lost his eyesight and be-
came totally blind the forepart of 1946, and the defendant, 
Freda Eisen, was his daughter; that W. D. Scott, a real 
estate broker negotiated with them for the sale of a resi-
dence under construction at 1887 Harrison A venue. A 
series of conferences resulted in the execution of an 
ernest money receipt and agreement together with a 
list of specifications (Exhibits 1 and A). Thereafter, 
this agreement was ·canceled hy mutual -consent and an-
other ernest money receipt was executed on August 10, 
1946 (Exhibit 2), This agreement was signed by B. D. 
Scott, Seller, and Isadore Eisen, Purchaser. Mr. Scott 
contended that at this time the -specifications were 
changed, eliminating a double-brick garage with over-
head doors, and instead, a double frame garage with over-
head doors was substituted (Exhibit C). On the other 
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hand, Isadore Eisen testified that the specifieations (Ex-
hibit . ..-\.) \Yere removed from Exhibit 1 and attached to 
the agreement executed on ~\ugust 10, 1946 (Exhibit 2). 
A \Yood garage "~as erected on the premises, notwith-
standing the objections and protest of the defendant, 
Isadore Eisen (Exhibit ·9). Isadore Eisen was in L·os 
Angeles, California, during the month of December, 1946, 
for an operation on his .eyes, and in his absence, defen-
dant Freda Eisen executed the agreements attached to 
plaintiffs' complaint (Exhibits 4 and 5). These docu-
ments, according to defendant, Isadore Eisen, were exe-
cuted without his authority; that he first learned about 
them in February, 1948; that he took possession of the 
premises and made payments to the plaintiffs on the 
basis of the agreement dated August 10, 1946, (Exhi-
bit 2); that upon his return from California in January, 
1947, he \Vas assured by the plaintiff, Albert P. Neilson, 
that the wood garage would be removed and a brick 
garage built in its place (R. 167). The plaintiffs failed 
to erect a brick garage with overhead doors and failed 
to complete the house in other respects and Mr. Eisen 
refused to pay the balance .of the il'urchase price until an 
adjustment was made. The evidence established that 
there was a decrease of $500.00 in value of the premises 
constructed with a wood garage instead of a brick garage 
(R. 123-124). That it would cost $1,150.00 to remove the 
\Yood garage and erect a brick garage in its place (R.126). 
It ,, ... as further established beyond dispute that the pre-
mises at the time suit was filed had been mortgaged by 
the plaintiffs to the First Federal Savings and Loan 
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Association in the sun1 of $8,500.00; that the note and 
n1ortgage was due and payable and plain~iff.s were in 
default at the date of trial and when judgment was ren-
dered (R. 106 and 110-111). 
Judgment was entered against the defendant, Isa-
dore Eisen, for $8,500.00 and $500.00 attorney fees, and 
in favor of the defendant, Freda Eisen, of no cause of 
action (R. 31-32). 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
The appellant assigns as error the following orders 
and rulings of the trial Court: 
1. The Court erred in overruling the demurrer of the 
d ef endan t to plain tiffs' complaint. 
2. The Court erred in making Finding of Fact No. 
6, (R. 27). 
3. The Court erred in making Finding of Fact No. 
7, (R. 27). 
4. The Court erred in making Finding of Fact No. 
9, (R. 27) 
5. The Court erred in making its Conclusion of Law 
No. 1, ( R. 28). 
6. The Court erred in making its Conclusion of Law 
No. 2, ( R. 28) . 
7. The Court erred in entering judgment in favor of 
the plaintiffs and against the defendant, Isadore Eisen. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
The plaintiffs must allege and prove a tend·er of a deed 
and abstract of title before they can maintain an action for 
the balance of the purchase price under the real estate 
contract. (Assignments of error numbers 1, 4, and 7 are 
involved in the discussion of this point.) 
The appellant in advancing this argument is assum-
ing, but not admitting, that he "\Vas a party to the uniform 
real estate contract. The })rovision in the contract in 
which we are concerned provided as follows: 
''The Seller ~on receiving the payment herein 
reserved to be paid at the times 1and in the manner 
above mentioned agrees to execute and deliver to 
the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient war-
ranty deed conveying the title to the above de-
scribed premises free and clear of all encum-
brances except as herein mentioned and except as 
may have accrued by or through the acts or ne-
glect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, 
an abstract or policy of title insurance, at the 
option of the Seller, brought to date at time of 
·sale or -at time of delivery of deed at the option 
of Buyer." 
The authorities are almost unanimous in holding a 
vendor, under such a provision, must allege and 1prove 
tender of a deed and abstract before he can require the 
vendee to pay the balance of th.e purchase; that these 
are mutual, dependent covenants; and that the vendee 
does not have to make full payment and then speculate 
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as to his chances of securing a proper deed of conveyance 
and an abstract of title. 
The rule is well stated and a case frequently cited 
is Boone vs. Tentpleman, et al., (Calif.) 110 P. 947, where 
the Court said: 
''Where in a contract f·or the s·ale of land 
the price is made payable in installments at dif-
ferent times and the deed is to be made when the 
whole is paid, the vendor may, upon failure to 
pay any intermediate installment, forthwith sue 
for its recovery. But, if he allows the whole to 
become due, the payment of the price then be-
comes a dependent and concurrent condition. Non-
ipayment alone does not put the vendee in default. 
The vendor must tender -a deed as a condition to 
demanding payment of the price, and he cannot, 
without such tender, ~declare a forfeiture, or main-
tain a suit either for the whole price, or for an in-
termediate installment.'' (Citing eases.) 
In a more recent California case, Casper Lumber Co. 
vs. StowBll, 98 P. 2nd 7 44, the plaintiff sued to recover 
the balance due upon ·a written contract for the sale of 
real property. 'The -complaint did not allege the rights 
of the vendee had been forfeited or that a tender of a 
conveyance was made but did :p~lead that plaintiff was 
willing and able to 1perform all of its obligations under 
the contract. The defendant interposed a general and 
special demurrer, both of which were sustained without 
leave to amend from which this appeal \vas taken. In 
affirming the judgment, the Court stated: 
''By his failure ;to allege a tender of perfor-
mance by the seller the pleader has rendered his 
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00mplain t den1urrable. The necessity of such (t 
ten·der is not a matter of eontroYP1'8Y in this 
state.'' (The court thereupon re-affirms the rule 
established in Boone Ys. Templernan, Supra.). 
The Court further stated: 
''In case of breach by the Yendee, the vendor 
may bring suit (1) for the instalments which are 
due~ (2) for damages for the breach; (3) for 
specific performance; ( 4) to foreclose ; or ( 5) to 
quiet title. The first two actions are at law, the 
last three in equity. A general offer to do equity, 
or a plea of readiness and willingness will excuse 
a plea of tender in a bill of equity. 26 RCL p. 626. 
This is on ithe p~rinciple that a court of equity once 
acquiring jurisdiction of the cause will assume 
full jurisdiction in order to do eomplete equity. 
But there is no such rule in resvect to a pure ac-
tion at law such as ""\Ve have here. In such case, 
1vhere the obligation of the vendor is to convey 
upon payment of the full purchase price, the two 
conditions are dependent and concurrent. No 
other rule is possible. Paragraph IV of the con-
tract of ·sale gives the vendor the option in case 
of any default 'Of vendee, to claim the entire 
balance due, or to claim the rights of the vendee 
forfeited. The complaint pleads that the vendor 
elected to claim the entire purchase price, and 
the written notice to the vendee pleaded as an ex-
·hibit is to that effect. No forfeiture was attempt-
ed and none pleaded. The rights of the parties 
are plain - if the vendor recovers the full 1pur-
chase price, the vendee is entitled to a conveyance 
.of the property. We are not impressed with appel-
lant's suggestion thrut resp·ondent might not satis-
fy the judgment, and hence no tender would be 
necessary, or that respondent might sue to quiet 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
title or sue in equity to co1npel appellant to ex-
ecute a deed. The principle of the ruling cases 
is that where under a contract for the sale of real 
property calling for the payment of the !purchase 
price in instalments, with an acceleration clause 
in the event of nonpayment ·of any instalment, 
the vendor exercises the acceleration option and 
declares the whole amount due, the parties are in 
the same position as when the final payments be-
come due by the lapse of time fixed in the contract. 
As ahove noted, the appellant herein did not claim 
a default or forfeiture, but demanded payment in 
full. Such a demand ~annot put the vendee in 
default without a tender ·of a deed. Lemle v. 
Barry, 181 Cal. 6, 10, 183 P. 148." 
To the same effect is Dubois vs. Andrews, (Okla.) 
152 P. 440. The plaintiff here, as vendor, commenced 
this action against the def.endant, as purchaser, of certain 
real estate for the balance of the purchase money there-
of evidenced by a series of promissory notes, all of which 
wer.e past due. The contract stipulated that when the 
purchase price had been paid, the plaintiff would execute 
a deed for the real estate to the purchaser. The com-
plaint did not alleg.e that the ~plaintiff had executed a 
deed to the 1purchaser, or had tendered a deed, or had 
offered to deliver the same upon the payment of the bal-
ance of the purchase money. The defendant filed a de-
murrer to the plaintiff's complaint upon the .grounds 
that the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute 
a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled and upon 
trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff. The 
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Supreme Court reversed the judgment upon the ground 
that the trial court erred in oYerruling the demurrer and 
stated: 
"'The la'v seems to be "\vell settled that, \vhere 
a note or a series ·of notes is given for the pur-
chase price of land and the contract of sale sti-
pulated that if the note or notes are 1paid at ma-
turity, the payee will convey the land to the 
maker. The payment of the balance .of the pur-
chase price and the execution of ~the conveyance 
are mutual and ~dependent convenants, and the 
execution of the conveyance or the offer to do so 
is essectial before an action can be maintained 
upon such note or notes.'' 
A case in which the entire complaint is set out and 
\vhich in all respects is similar to the allegations of plain-
tiff's complaint is Will-0-Way Development Co. vs. Mills, 
(Ohio), 171 N.E. 94, 171 N.E. 360. The p~laintiff here 
brought· an action for the unpaid balance due under the 
terms of a real estate contract. It alleged that it had 
performed all the terms and conditions on its part to be 
performed, and was ready, willing, and able to ·comply 
with said contract at all times. Defendant interposed a 
general demurrer upon the grounds that the complaint 
did not state a cause of action. The Demurrer was sus-
tained and plaintiff appealed. In affirming the judgment, 
the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals ruled that 
plaintiff must plead and :p,rove a tender of a deed to pre-
vail in an action for the balance of the purchas·e vrice. 
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Plaintiff urged that it did not have to do a vain thing 
by making a tender 'vhen the vendee notified it of her re-
fusal to go forward with the contract. In this connection, 
the court said : 
.''That would be ·SO, so far as the right to 
recover damages wa:s concerned, but, as already 
pointed out, this is not that sort of an action. It 
is to get the purchase price, and therefore a tender 
is necessary and is not a vain or useless thing. We 
think the defendant is entitled to have a tender 
made of the deed before she is called upon to pay 
the money, :and we think thart the petition, not 
~stating this, does not state a cause of action.'' 
And in B·t. John vs. Richard, (Mich.), 262 N. W. 437, 
the court stated: 
"It is well ·settled in this state that before 
one may sue on a land eontract to recover the 
balance of the unpaid purchase price, he must 
tender a deed of the premises contracted to be 
sold.'' 
Also, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Heights 
Land ~co .. vs. Swengel's Estate, 179 A. 431, set -out the 
rule as follows: 
''An action to compel payment of the pur-
chase money cannot be maintained by the vendor 
without tender of a conveyance before suit 
brought. (Citing eases.) With this requirement 
plaintiff did not comp1ly. The statement of claim 
does not .aver tender of a deed; all that it sets 
forth is the veiled ·averment that 'the plaintiff 
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has al\Yays been and still is ready, willing, and 
able to perform its agreement.' This 'vas not suf-
ficient to sustain this action; the bare averment 
of readiness and "~illingness to perform cannot 
erect by construction into an averment of tender 
of full performance.'' 
The Idaho Supren1e Court In Walsh, et ux. vs. 
Coghlan et al., 190 P. 252, states the general rule at page 
~53: 
"The record discloses that all the unpaid in-
stallments of purchase price were due ·at the time 
the action was commenced. There£ore, in order 
to be in position to demand a forfeiture of appel-
lants' interest, or to ·w .. aive it and recover judg-
ment for the purchase price, it was necessary for 
respondents to allege and prove they tendered a 
deed eonveying the 1prop~e:rrty to the purchasers, 
together with an abstract showing title -as men-
tioned in the con tract.'' 
See also, Stevens et ux. vs. Irwin, et ux, (Wash.), 
231 P. 783. 
W ernes vs. Z entsmaster, 61 Fed. 2nd, 298. 
Plaintiffs should not he permitted to prevail with-
out proving the tender of a deed and an abstract showing 
good title. To do so, may require the appellant to perfect 
the title by a suit to quite title. This, under the terms 
of the contract, is the plaintiffs' obligation and not the 
appellant's. 
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POINT 2 
Upon encumbrance of land by mortguge, vendor must 
tender title subject to mortgage and cannot maintain an 
action for balance of purchase price. (Assignment of Error 
number 7.) 
In addition to the provision mentioned in Point 1, 
the uniform real estate eontract contained the following 
prOVISIOn: 
''The 'Seller is hereby given the option to 
execute and maintain a loan secured by mortgage 
upon said property of not 1to exceed ~,500.00, 
bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed 5 per 
cent. When the principal has been reduced to the 
amount of the loan and mortgage, the Seller 
agrees to convey and Buyer agrees to accept title 
to the above deseribed property, subject to said 
loan and mortgage.'' 
The plaintiffs, in following the terms of the con-
tract, elected to encumber the pro!perty with a mortgage 
in the amount of $8,500.00, an amount which represents 
or which is equal to the unpaid portion of the purchase 
price for which plaintiffs are now seeking recovery. W·e 
have ealled attention in Point 1 to the f.act that the para-
graph relating to the manner in which title was to be 
conveyed in ·event of the payment of the full purchase 
price by the Buyer contemplated that the Seller execute 
and deliver to the Buyer or assigns a good and sufficient 
warranty deed conveying the title to the premises in-
volved, free and clear of all encumbrances. It should be 
noted that this general provision relating to the manner 
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of con11pletion of the contract contained a major excep-
tion, "€xcept as herein n1entioned a:nd except as ·may 
have accrued by or through the acts or neglect of the 
Buyer". This exception lmdoubtedly relates to the man-
ner of conveyance that must be follo-\ved under the terms 
of the contract if the Seller exercised the option to en-
cumber the prop·erty permitted by the above quoted 
paragraph of the contract. Accordingly, \Ye urge that 
the vendor, once having encumbered the land, may not 
sue for the balance of the purchas-e price but must con-
vey title subject to the mortgage. 
In the case of Glassman vs. Condon, 27 Utah 463, 
76 P. 343, plaintiff entered into a contract to sell property 
to the defendant. The property at the time was subject 
to a $1,000.00 mortgage. The contract, after providing 
for :payments and the re-duction of such mortgage, then 
provided: 
'' ... leaving a balance of $250.00 for which 
the party of the second part assumes and agrees 
to pay $250.00 of a mortgage of $1,000.00 now ex-
isting and covering on the above described land 
with other lands . 
. ''The party of the first .p,art agrees to make 
to the party of the second part a warranty deed 
upon the payment of $275.00 on October 1, 1902, 
subject to a mortgage of $250.00 which party of 
the second part assumes and agrees to pay.'' 
Plaintiff tendered the warranty deed and demanded the 
$275.00. Defendant refused to accept and refused to 
make further payments on the ground that the $1,000.00 
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mortgage remained unpaid. The Supreme Court of Utah, 
in holding for the defendant, states: 
"It is an elementary principle of law that 
every purchaser of real property has a right to 
demand a title free from encumbrances and de-
fects .... 
' 'A purchaser in every s-ale, unless he specifi-
cally stipulates to the contrary, has a right to 
expect that he will acquire a valid and unassailable 
title, and the law assumes that he !purchases with 
that object in view." 
·Similarly in our case the Buyer entered into a con-
tract contemplating a receipt of title under one of two 
situations; either one clear of all encumbrances, as pro-
vided in the latter part of the contract, or one subject 
to an encumbrance not to exceed the sum of $8,500.00. 
The Buyer, once the land became subject to encumbrance, 
was entitled to r·eceive a tender of a deed forthwith, sub-
ject to encumbrance, and was not required to take the 
risk that upon payment of the balance of the purchase 
price, such encumbrance would be discharged by the 
vendor and a marketable title delivered. 
When a contract involving real property contain-
ing option similar to the above quoted option, it must 
be strictly construed, and other portions of the contract 
must be ·construed, in the light of such option. In Cousins 
vs. Melvin F. Lampha.r & ·Co., (Mich.), 20 NW 2nd, 783, it 
was held that a provision in a land contract authorizing 
the vendor to encumber lands by mortgage, to secure 
not more than the balance owing thereon at the time of 
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mortgage, and a provision authorizing the vendor to 
convert a land eontract into a mortgage whenever pur-
chaser should ag·ree to accept a deed in fulfillment of the 
land contract, and execute a mortgage for the unpaid 
balance owing on the contract, were to be construed to-
gether in light of ·all of the terms of the original land 
contract. 
In our immediate case, the vendor has encumbered 
the land and at the same moment seeks to recover the 
unpaid amount of the purchase price. By such process, 
the ve-ndor not only fails to leave himself in a position 
whereby he can deliver a good and marketable title 
but thrusts upon the vendee the risk that the mortgagee 
will not release the mortgage at some subsequent date. 
This situation was considered in the case of Hinckley vs. 
Snzith, 51 NY 21. In th·at case the existence of a mortgage 
against the property was held to relieve the vendee of 
the duty of performing on his part. It was .pointed out 
that to impose this duty on the vendee, the mortgagees 
ought to have been vresent, with releases duly executed 
and prepared to be delivered, or such documents as would 
render the premises free of encumbrance ought to have 
been entrusted to some person, who would be present 
when the offer was made, having authority to deliver or 
record them upon receiving the mortgage which the ven-
dee had agreed to execute in substitution thereof. The 
court said: 
"There was no certainty that she (the ven-
dee) would have been able to ;obtain a title to 
the .p~remises, freed from the outstanding mort-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
gages, if she had accepted the deed from plaintiff 
and delivered her bond and mortgage according to 
the contract. The hazar·d of the mortgagees con-
tinuing to be of the same mind, and willing tore-
lease the tavern stand upon the ·Security of her 
1nortgage, would have been changed from the ven-
dor to the purchaser without any reasonable in-
demnity .... Mrs. Smith had not agreed, and 
cannot be required to accept such a risk.'' 
The plaintiffs have placed the defendant in a position 
where he may have to pay $8,500.00 twice, once pursuant 
to the judgment entered herein, and the other to the 
company holding the mortgage. The law, as set forth by 
the cases cited in this brief, is to the effect that the ven-
dor must deliver title to the vendee free and clear of all 
encumbrances unless it appears in the contract that the 
parties intended delivery of the premises subject to an 
encumbrance. In the contract sued upon in this case, 
the vendors had the 01ption of mortgaging the property, 
'\vhich from the evidence appears that they did so to 
the extent of $8,500.00, being the balance due under the 
contract. It was therefore the duty of the vendors to 
tender a deed subject to the mortgage. They cannot bring 
an action for what is owing on the mortgage. In other 
words, the vendors have no cause of action against the 
vendee for the reason that there is nothing due them. 
Vendors had only one duty to perform and that was to 
deliver a deed subject to the mortgage. Buahanan vs. 
Alw·ell, (Tenn.) 8 Humph. 518, 50 ALR 204; 55 Am. Jur. 
p·aragraph 515 (Vendor and Purchaser), 55 Am. Jur. 
916 (Vendor and Purchaser), paragraph 522; 57 ALR 
1379. 
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POINT 3 
Where a writing is required for authorization of an 
act on the part of an agent, it must be affirmed by the prin-
cipal in writing in order to constitute ratification. (Assign-
ments of Error No. 2, 3, 5, 6.) 
In America-n Lau· Inst-itHte, Resta.te1nent of Law on 
.A.gency, paragrruph 93, it is stated: 
"Where formalities are requisite for author-
ization of an act. It affirmance must be by the 
same formalities in order to constitute a ratifi-
cation.'' 
Section 33-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides 
as follows: 
''No estate or interest in real property, other~ 
than leases for a term not exceeding one year, 
nor any trust or power over or concerning real 
property ·or in any manner relating thereto, shall 
be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or 
declared otherwise than by act or ·operation of law, 
or by deed or :eonveyance in writing subscribed 
by the party creating, granting, assigning, sur-
rendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized by writing.'' 
In 2 Am. Jur., Section 215, page 172, the rule rela-
tive to ratification is stated as follows: 
''A ratification of an ·act done by one assum-
ing to be an agent relates back and is equivalent 
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to a prior authority. When, therefore, the adop. 
tion of any particular form or mode is necessary 
to confer the authority in the first instance, there 
can be no valid ratification except in the same 
manner. But since for most 1purposes no particu-
lar mode or form is necessary to confer an author-
ity, it may be said generally that no particular 
form of ratification is ordinarily necessary. In 
most instances, ratification may be established by 
p~arol, and even by implication from the conduct 
of the purported principal manifesting that he 
·consents to be a party to the transaction or from 
conduct justifiable only if there is ·a ratification. 
If, however, the act is one which requires a written 
authorization, the ratification of an unauthorized 
act must also be in writing. Thus, where the stat-
ute requires the authority of an agent to sell 
lands to be in writing, an oral approval of an un· 
authorized ~sale or a sale upon different terms 
than those upon which the authority was origin-
ally made, is unavailing. Also, where power to 
execute an instrument under seal must be con-
ferred by an instrument of equal solemnity, the 
ratification of the unauthorized act of the agent in 
executing the sealed instrument is required to be 
under seal; a parol ratification by the principal 
is insufficient. '' 
In 2 ~C.J.S .. paragraph 46, page 1091, it is stated: 
"In the absence of some element of equitable 
estop1pel where the original authority to an agent 
to execute an act must be in writing, the ratifica-
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tion of the act done w·ithout authority must also 
be in writing.'' 
To the same effect, see :2 C.J. parag'raph 106, page 
487, 'vherein the rule is stated as follo·w·s: 
"Where the original authority to an agent 
to execute an act must be in \Vriting, the ratifica-
tion of the act done \vithout authority must, ... 
be in writing.'' 
Under our Statute of Frauds cited above, an agent 
to ID'ake a contract affecting realty must be authorized by 
a principal in writing before he can make a valid con-
tract. If the agent, without written authority, makes a 
contract, it can be ratified by the principal in writing. 
Parol or oral approval is not sufficient to constitute rati-
:fica tion under such circumstances. In this case, Freda 
Eisen, the daughter of the appellant, did not have any 
authorization in writing from her father to execute the 
uniform real estate contract, upon whieh the plaintiff's 
action is p~redicated. 
The Court made findings that Isadore Eisen autho-
rized his daughter to act for and on behalf of him in 
the execution of the agreements for the purchase of the 
house and that Isadore Eisen knew of and consented 
to the authorized acts of his daughter. These findings are 
bas-ed solely upon inferences from defendant's acts. 
Now here in the record is there any written approval on 
the 1part of Isadore Eisen of the purchase made by his 
daughter of the property in question. The lack of written 
approval by the defendant defeats the plaintiffs' con-
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tention and the Court's judgment that the acts of Freda 
Eisen were ratified and therefore the execution of the 
contract by her was the act of her father. 
In Norton VB •. Overholtzor, et al, (California) 218 
P. 637, real property was listed with a real estate broker 
for sale under a written listing, and the broker made 
a. contract of sale in the name of the owner, believing 
he had such authority under his listing, it was held 
that without written ratification on the part of the owner, 
the contract made by the agent was not enforcible. 
Under similar circumstances a like holding w·as 
made in the case of Rosenweig vs. Akers, et al, (Ariz.) 
245 P. 278. 
The record clearly discloses that Isadore Eisen at 
all times believed that all payments ·made on the house 
were on the preliminary agreement between himself and 
B. D. Scott. There is no oral or written evidence that 
he ever ratified the contract between the plaintiffs. and 
his daughter. The ~plaintiffs dealt directly with Freda 
Eisen. They were not concerned about Isadore Eisen 
as the Purchaser. Mr. Neilson, on direct examination 
testified: 
'' Q : Did you have any concern over or par-
ticular interest in who signed ·as the buyer~ 
"A: No, I didn't." l(R. 99). 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against 
the appellant should be reversed. The evidence failed 
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to establish that appellant 'vas a 1party to the real estate 
contract. If, however, the court should determine other-
wise, the judgment should not be permitted to stand he-
cause plaintiffs did not and could not produce and tender 
a marketable title. Havin,g encumbered the property 
with a mortgage in a sum equal to the balance of the 
purchase price, plaintiffs "'"ere thereafter precluded from 
brincing an action for the balance of the purchase price. 
They should have tendered appellant a deed subject to 
the mortgage and an abstract indicating that sueh mort-
gage was the only defect in the title. 
In any view of the case, on reason, logic and judicial 
precedent, plaintiffs' judgment against appellant should 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. G. METOS 
SAMUEL BERNSTEIN 
Attorneys f'Or Defendant and 
Appellant, Isadore Eisen 
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